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whether the sentence was imposed "as 
a result of' a misapplication of the 
Guidelines depends on ''whether the 
district court would have imposed the 
same sentence had it not relied upon 
the invalid factor or factors." Id. Ap-
plying this test, the Court noted that 
when a district court intentionally de-
parts from the Guideline range, the 
court's sentence is "imposed 'as a re-
sult of' a misapplication ofthe Guide-
lines, if the sentence would have been 
different but for the district court's 
error." Id. 
This decision provides substantial 
insight into the scope of appellate re-
view under the Guidelines of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. The Supreme 
Court in Williams gave an extremely 
narrow reading to the scope of such 
review, and emphasized the deference 
that appellate courts are to give to a 
district court's exercise of its sentenc-
ing discretion. In so ruling, the Court 
established a national consensus on the 
scope of appellate review under the 
Sentencing Reform Act. 
- Gloria A. Worch 
3011 Corp. v. District Court: 
CORPORATIONS CHARGED 
WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL. 
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court, 
327 Md.463, 610 A.2d 766 (1992), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a corporation has a right to a trial 
by jury when it is charged with a crimi-
nal offense carrying a maximum pen-
alty of imprisonment in excess of 90 
days. In a unanimous decision, the 
court interpreted section 4-302( e )(2)(i) 
ofMaryland's Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article as providing a statu-
tory right to a jury trial based on the 
maximum penalty provided for the 
offense itself and not the penalty likely 
to be imposed upon a particular defen-
dant. Therefore, although a corpora-
tion is not subject to imprisonment, it 
is entitled to a jury trial. 
3011 Corporation, trading as U.S. 
Books, and L.R. News, Inc., trading as 
Edgewood Books, were adult book 
stores in Harford County. Both corpo-
rations were charged with 100 counts 
of knowingly displaying sexually ori-
ented material for advertising purposes 
in violation of art. 27, section 416D of 
the Maryland Code. Each violation 
was punishable by a fine of up to 
$1,000 or imprisonment of up to six 
months. Both corporations also were 
charged with one count of exhibiting 
obscene matter in violation of art. 27, 
section 418 of the Maryland Code. 
The penalty for this charge was up to a 
$1,000 fme and/or imprisonment up to 
one year. Similar charges were filed 
against Larry Hicks, who was an offi-
cer of both corporations. 
All parties requested a jury trial. 
The District Court for Harford County 
granted Mr. Hicks's demand for a jury 
trial and subsequently tninsferred his 
case to the Circuit Court for Harford 
County. However, the district court 
denied both corporations' request for a 
jury trial and the corporations filed 
petitions for writs of certiorari to the 
Circuit Court for Harford County. After 
a hearing, the petitions were dismissed 
and the corporations appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
While the appeal was pending, the 
counts for exhibiting obscene material 
were dismissed. Before argument in 
the court of special appeals, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ 
of certiorari to determine whether a 
corporation charged in district court 
with a criminal offense carrying a pen-
alty in excess of 90 days had a right to 
a jury trial. 
Thecorporations argued in the court 
of appeals that they had a statutory 
right to jury trial under section 4-
302(e)(2)(i) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, and that they were 
entitled to a constitutional right to a 
jury trial under Articles 5,21, and 23 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
and under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. 3011 Corp., 327 Md. 467-
68, 610 A.2d 768. The State argued 
that no corporation ever has the right to 
ajury trial under the statute because the 
statute requires a defendant to be sub-
ject to more than 90 days imprison-
ment and a corporation cannot be im-
prisoned. Id. at 468, 610 A.2d at 768. 
The State contested the Maryland con-
stitutional right to a jury trial by argu-
ing that the charge was a minor offense 
to which the right to jury trial does not 
attach. Id, 610 A.2dat768-69 (citing, 
e.g., State v. Huebner, 305 Md. 601, 
608-10,505 A.2d l331,l335 (1986». 
The State also argued that there was no 
federal constitutional right to a jury 
trial for corporations since a corpora-
tion could not be imprisoned and the 
maximum fines were not substantial. 
Id., 610 A.2d at 769. 
The court of appeals found a right 
to a jury trial through statutory inter-
pretation and did not reach the consti-
tutional issues. The court ruled that if 
the crime with which the defendant is 
charged carries a penalty of imprison-
ment in excess of 90 days, a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial ifhe 
makes a timely request in district court. 
Id. at 469, 610 A.2dat 769. Thecourt 
rejected the State's contention that the 
particular defendant must be subject to 
imprisonment in excess of 90 days, 
holding that ''the maximum penalty 
provision relates to the offense itself 
and not the parti~ular defendant." Id. 
(emphasis in original). The court found 
that the Maryland General Assembly 
distinguished between less serious and 
more serious criminal offenses by au-
thorizing more than 90 days imprison-
ment for more serious crimes. Id 
Thus, the option of a jury trial was 
allowed for offenses with a maximum 
penalty in excess of90 days. Id. The 
court emphasized that the controlling 
principle guiding the constitutional 
right to a jury trial is the maximum 
sentence and place of incarceration that 
the legislature established for the par-
ticular offense, not the maximum sen-
tence or place of incarceration to which 
this particular defendant may be sub-
jected. Id (citingKawamurav. State, 
299 Md. 276, 292, 473 A.2d438, 447 
(1984». The court found that the Mary-
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land General Assembly used this same 
principle in establishing the statutory 
right to a jury trial under section 4-
302( e )(2)(i). 
In addition, because one of the 
criminal violations was dismissed by 
the district court after a jury trial was 
demanded by the corporate defendants, 
the court of appeals clarified the effect 
of the dismissal on the right to a jury 
trial. Id. at 467 n. 6, 610 A.2d at 768 n. 
6. The court noted that it considered 
the offenses charged at the time ofthe 
demand for a jury trial. Id. As long as 
the defendant was entitled to a jury trial 
at the time ofthe demand, a subsequent 
dismissal or nol pros of one of the 
charged offenses has no effect on the 
right to a jury trial. Id. (citing State v. 
Huebner, 305 Md. 601, 606-07, 505 
A.2d 1331, 1334 (1986)). 
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court, 
the court of appeals established that a 
corporation has the same statutory right 
to a jury trial as an individual charged 
with the same criminal offense if the 
offense carries a prison sentence in 
excess of90 days. In placing its focus 
on the statutory penalty, and not the 
penalty applicable to the particular 
defendant in a case, the court of ap-
peals reaffirmed the fundamental na-
ture of the right to jury trial and the 
principle that, although not subject to 
imprisonment, corporations are treated 
like individuals under the law. 
- Kenneth A. Brown 
Lee v. Weisman: COURT HOLDS 
NON-SECT ARIAN PRAYER AT 
SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADU-
ATION CEREMONY VIOLATES 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
InLeev. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 
(1992), the United States Supreme 
Court held that offering invocation and 
benediction prayers as part ofthe for-
mal graduation ceremonies for sec-
ondary schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Inso 
holding, the Court declined to recon-
sider the three-part Establishment 
Clause test set forth in Lemon lI. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
In lune 1989, Deborah Weisman 
graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle 
School, a public school in Providence, 
Rhode Island The school principal 
invited a rabbi to deliver prayers in 
conjunction with the graduation exer-
cises for the class. The principal pro-
vided the speaker with a pamphlet en-
titled ''Guidelines for Civic Occasions," 
prepared by the National Conference 
of Christians andlews. This pamphlet 
advised members of the clergy per-
forming the prayers that the invocation 
and benediction should be non-sectar-
ian. In this case, the invocation and 
benediction were non-sectarian, how-
ever, they did contained references to 
God. 
Prior to Deborah's graduation cer-
emony, Deborah's father, Daniel 
Weisman, in his individual capacity as 
a taxpayer and as next friend of 
Deborah, sought a temporary restrain-
ing order in the United District Court 
for the District of Rhode Island. 
Weisman sought to prohibit the school 
officials from including the prayers in 
the graduation ceremony. The court 
denied the motion and her family even-
tually attended the graduation where 
the prayers were recited 
Thereafter, the case was submitted 
to the District Court on stipulated facts. 
The court held that the practice of 
utilizing prayers in the context of pub-
lic school graduations violated the 
three-part Establishment Clause test 
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon 
test, in order ''to satisfy the Establish-
ment Clause, a governmental practice 
must (1) reflect a clearly secular pur-
pose; (2) have a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
and (3) avoid excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Weisman, 
112 S. Ct. at 2654 (citing Committee 
for Public Education & Religious Lib-
erty lI. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 
(1973)). Applying this test, the district 
court enjoined the Providence School 
Committee from continuing to employ 
this practice. Id. Specifically, the 
school district violated the second prong 
of the Lemon test by creating an atmo-
sphere in which the state identified 
with a religion. Id. 
The school officials appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit which agreed with the 
holding and rationale of the district 
court. Id. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to address the 
issue of whether the use of invocations 
and benedictions at a public school 
graduation violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
The Court began its analysis by 
emphasizing that even though atten-
dance at public school graduation is 
voluntary, "attendance and participa-
tion [which may include] state-spon-
sored religious activity are in a 1hlr and 
real sense obligatory ... " Id. at 2655. 
The Court explicitly refused the invita-
tion to reconsider its decision inLemon, 
because the government involvement 
with the invocation and benediction at 
the public school graduation was ''per-
vasive, to the point of creating a state-
sponsored and state directed religious 
exercise in a public schooL" Id. The 
Court noted that the school principal's 
involvement with the composition of 
the prayers and the choice of a rabbi to 
perform the prayers was akin to the 
State deciding by statute that an invo-
cation and benediction should be given. 
Id. at 2655. Along similar lines, the 
court reasoned that by providing the 
rabbi with a copy of the Guidelines for 
Civic Occasions, the principal ostensi-
bly "directed and controlled the con-
tent of the prayer." Id. at 2656. The 
Court asserted that it was inappropri-
ate for government to compose or pro-
vide official prayers for recitation at an 
event in part sponsored by the govern-
ment. Id. at 2656 (citing Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962)). 
The Court next turned its analysis 
to the issue of coercive pressure among 
students in elementary and secondary 
public schools and the n~ to protect 
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